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PART V 
Foundations of Social Cognition 
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CHAPTER 15 
Building Intentional Action Knowledge with One’s Hands 
Sarah Gerson and Amanda Woodward 
Understanding others’ actions as intentional is fundamental to everyday social life. Adults view 
even the simplest and most concrete actions not as sheer movements, but rather as actions 
organized by intentions. To illustrate, observing a group of children and a ball traversing a soccer 
field, we perceive the motions of the former, but not the latter, as structured with respect to a 
goal, in this case the goal of driving the ball across the field to score. This foundational aspect of 
social perception is a critical ingredient in social, cognitive, and linguistic development. In the 
first years of life, children acquire a great deal of knowledge from other people. By 12 to 18 
months of age, if not earlier, this learning is mediated by an analysis of others’ intentions 
(Baldwin & Moses, 2001; Meltzoff, 1995; Tomasello, 1999). Deficiencies in this ability have 
devastating developmental effects, as seen in individuals with autism. In this chapter, we will 
consider the potential origins of the ability to discern others’ intentions in acting. 
Recent findings have shown that by the middle of the first year, infants represent certain 
actions in terms of their intentional structure (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2003; Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Woodward, 1998; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). For 
example, in a series of studies from our laboratory (Guajardo & Woodward, 2004; Woodward, 
1998, 1999, 2003), infants 6 months of age and older viewed events in which a person reached 
toward and grasped one of two toys. The question of interest was whether infants, like adults, 
would represent this event as goal-directed, that is, in terms of the relation between the agent and 
her goal. Following habituation, the positions of the two toys were switched. Then the 
 601 
experimenter reached for either a new toy in the same place (new-object trials) or the same toy in 
a new place (new-side trials). Infants looked longer to the new-object trials than the new-side 
trials, indicating that they represented the event in terms of the relation between agent and goal, 
rather than strictly in terms of physical properties such as the movement and position of the 
actor’s arm.  
Critically, several subsequent findings confirmed that infants’ responses in this paradigm 
indicate more than an association between the hand and the object it grasps. Rather, infants 
encoded the reaching events in terms of the relational structure of the action. This conclusion is 
supported by the outcomes of comparison events in which one object moves toward another, but, 
unlike the hand, the moving object is not readily construed as an agent. For example, in one 
control condition, infants saw a mechanical claw move toward and grasp a toy (Woodward, 
1998). If infants only encoded the association between two “objects” (the hand and toy or the 
claw and toy), their responses in these two situations would be equivalent. However, infants in 
the mechanical claw condition looked equally long at the new-object and new-side test events.  
Additional evidence that infants attend to relations between agents and goals comes from 
recent work by Luo and Baillargeon (2007): 12-month-old infants did not show selective 
attention to goal change events if the agent could only see one of two objects during habituation 
(the other object was visible to the infant but hidden from the experimenter’s view). In this 
paradigm, the association between the hand and the goal-object was identical to Woodward’s 
(1998) paradigm but the actor’s knowledge of the potential goals differed. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that infants considered the agent’s intentional relations to the objects, rather than 
simply the association of the hand with the object it grasped. These findings also indicate that 
infants understand that an agent’s goals are limited by perception.  
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Infants’ sensitivity to the goal structure of others’ actions is also evident in other 
paradigms, including those that assess imitative responses (Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, in 
press; Meltzoff, 1995) and other overt spontaneous social behaviors in experimental contexts 
(Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). For example, like older infants and children, 7-
month-old infants selectively reproduce the goals of observed actions, thereby revealing, with 
their hands, the same goal analysis that has been shown in looking time studies (Hamlin et al., in 
press; Mahajan & Woodward, 2007).  
Toward the end of the first year of life, infants become increasingly able to discern the 
goal structure of more complex actions. By 9 to 12 months, for example, infants represent others’ 
gaze as indicating relations between the looker and the object at which her eyes are pointed. 
Evidence for this ability comes from looking time studies (Johnson, Ok, & Luo, 2007; Phillips, 
Wellman, & Spelke, 2002; Sodian & Thoermer, 2004; Woodward, 2003) and studies assessing 
infants’ overt social responses (Moll & Tomasello, 2004; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). Further, 
by this same age, infants represent goals that span individual actions. For example, they can 
represent the relation between actions on a tool or intermediary and the attainment of an ultimate 
goal (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Sommerville, Hildebrand, & Crane, in press; Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).  
ORIGINS OF INTENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING 
While this evidence makes clear that the ability to recover intentional structure from observed 
actions exists early in life, the ontogenetic origins of this ability are still in question. How do the 
beginnings of these understandings appear? How do changes in understanding come about? As is 
the case in other domains of infant cognition, current positions on these questions range from the 
strongly nativist (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Kiraly, Jovanovic, Prinz, 
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Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003) to strongly emphasizing the role of experience (e.g., Meltzoff, 
1995; Tomasello, 1999; Woodward, 2005). At this point, there is little direct evidence available 
to distinguish among these views because most studies have not investigated developmental 
change and its possible causes. Instead, studies have typically taken a “snapshots” approach, 
seeking evidence for focal abilities at a particular point in time but not considering how these 
abilities may change as a function of other events in development.  
In this chapter, we will attempt to begin to fill this void by considering a category of 
experience that has long been hypothesized to contribute to intentional understanding, namely 
first-person agentive experience. The idea that action production and action understanding are 
linked in development has been around for over a century (Baldwin, 1897; Piaget, 1953). A 
number of current proposals have at their core the idea that one’s own actions provide unique 
insight into the structure of others’ actions (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Meltzoff, 1995; Tomasello, 
1999).  
Theoretically, it seems reasonable that one’s own experience as an agent could provide 
useful information for understanding other agents. A true test of this general hypothesis requires 
(1) measuring infants’ analysis of observed action structure and (2) relating this measure to 
variations in infants’ own actions. We turn first to recent studies that have done just this, and in 
so doing provided initial evidence that this general proposal is on the right track. We will then 
turn to the much harder question of why self-produced experience might have an effect on the 
development of action understanding. This question will lead us to consider recent work on 
mirror systems, the limits of mirror systems, and the role of analogy in conceptual development. 
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EVIDENCE FOR LINKS BETWEEN ACTION PRODUCTION AND 
ACTION UNDERSTANDING 
As researchers began to document infants’ emerging sensitivity to the goal structure of action, a 
coincidence became apparent. Infants and children are generally able to produce particular 
actions around the same age at which they are also able to understand these actions in others. 
Around 4 to 5 months of age, infants begin to make intentional grasps themselves (Bertenthal & 
Clifton, 1998; Rochat, 1989) and also begin to understand grasp as goal-directed (Woodward, 
1998). Around 9 to 12 months of age, infants begin to engage in shared attention and triadic 
interactions (Adamson & McArthur, 1995; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998) and also 
begin to understand gaze and pointing as implying a relation between the agent and the target of 
her attention (Brune & Woodward, 2007; Woodward, 2003; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). 
Also, as infants are first able to produce goal-directed action sequences (around 9 to 12 months 
of age; Bates, Carlson-Luden, & Bretherton, 1980; Piaget, 1953), they begin to understand the 
ultimate goal of a means–end sequence that another person performs (Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).  
Two approaches have been taken to follow up on these coincidences to determine 
whether, in fact, they reflect developmental relations between acting and understanding actions. 
The first is to assess, within the same infants, correlations between action production and action 
perception. The second is to intervene to change infants’ self-produced experience and then 
assess the effects of this intervention on infants’ action perception.  
Correlational Evidence 
During times of developmental change, a great deal of individual variation can be seen in 
children at a given age, and therefore, links between motor capabilities and understanding of 
these actions can be examined keeping age constant. For example, between 10 and 12 months of 
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age, a great deal of variability exists in infants’ ability to produce planful actions such as pulling 
a cloth to get a toy. There is also individual variation in the ability to understand goal structure in 
these kinds of means–end sequences. In a paradigm assessing the understanding of these means–
end actions, Sommerville and Woodward (2005) habituated infants to sequences in which an 
actor pulled a cloth in order to get a toy on its far edge. The question was whether infants 
represented the actor’s action on the cloth as directed at the ultimate goal (the toy) or at the cloth 
itself. To address this question, after habituation, infants were shown test events in which the 
toys’ positions were reversed and the actor only produced the first action in the sequence, 
grasping a cloth. Thus, infants viewed new-cloth trials, on which the actor grasped the other 
cloth, which now supported the previous goal toy, or new-toy trials, on which the actor grasped 
the same cloth as before, which now held a different toy. Twelve-month-olds looked longer on 
new-toy trials than new-cloth trials, showing that they represented the action on the cloth as 
directed at the toy. Ten-month-olds, in contrast, were variable in their responses, showing no 
reliable group preference. At this age, there was a correlation between infants’ own cloth-pulling 
abilities and their looking time responses (see Figure 15.1). Infants who were well organized in 
their own ability to pull a cloth to get a toy looked longer on new-toy trials, whereas infants who 
were unable to produce an organized and planful cloth-pulling action looked longer on new-cloth 
trials. Importantly, this finding demonstrated that infants who were unable to perform this 
means–end action were not completely disorganized concerning their understanding of the 
intention behind this action when observing another. Instead, these infants understood this action 
on a simpler level, wherein the end-goal of the action was the cloth, as if it were a simple grasp.  
Figure 15.1 about here 
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Other studies have found additional correlations between infants’ own abilities to act and 
their responses to others’ actions. For example, between 9 and 12 months of age, a great deal of 
individual variation exists in infants’ production of point and engagement in shared attention; 
there is also individual variation in the ability to understand point and gaze. Woodward and 
Guajardo (2002) found a relation between infants’ ability to produce object-directed points and 
their understanding of point in a habituation paradigm. In addition, a study by Brune and 
Woodward (2007) supported the correlation between production and understanding of pointing 
and also found a correlation between infants’ engagement in shared attention and understanding 
of gaze as object-directed at 10 months of age.  
This correlational evidence is important in that it demonstrates a specific link between 
production and understanding of particular actions. In addition, these results demonstrate that 
data from looking time studies is clearly related to developments in infants’ overt actions. Most 
importantly for the current arguments, this evidence provides an initial view of the link between 
action production and action understanding and how this link may lead to developmental change. 
It demonstrates that the developmental concordance in time reviewed above is more than mere 
coincidence. Importantly, however, correlational evidence does not shed light on the causal 
contributors to this relation. Next, we will discuss evidence that goes beyond correlations in an 
attempt to examine causality. 
Intervention Evidence 
In intervention studies, infants at the cusp of performing a particular skill are trained or 
supported in a new self-produced action and then the effect of the training on their understanding 
of that action is assessed. This approach provides clearer evidence about the effects of acting on 
action understanding. For example, 3-month-olds are generally not yet skilled in producing goal-
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directed grasps and they do not typically understand the relation between another’s grasp and his 
or her goal. In a study by Sommerville, Woodward, and Needham (2005), infants received 
training in which they were able to manipulate the movement of toys using Velcro mittens. 
Infants’ object-directed touching (as indicated by simultaneous looking and touching of the toys) 
increased with the use of the mittens. After training, infants responded to observed mittened 
reaching actions as goal-directed in the habituation paradigm described earlier (see Figure 15.2). 
That is, infants who had undergone training showed a strong novelty response on new-object 
trials but not on new-side trials. In contrast, infants who had not undergone training looked 
equally on the two kinds of test trials. Moreover, in the training group, there was a strong 
correlation between the extent to which infants had engaged in object-directed actions with the 
mittens and the degree of their novelty response on new-object trials. Thus, engaging in object-
directed action seemed to drive infants’ subsequent responses to observed reaching events. These 
results support the conclusion that infants’ own actions provide structure for the perception of 
others’ actions.  
Figure 15.2 about here 
Similar intervention effects have also been found with means–ends actions such as cane-
pulling (Sommerville et al., in press). In this study, 10-month-old infants trained to use a cane to 
reach for a toy were able to understand the ultimate goal of a cane-pulling sequence in a 
habituation paradigm (they looked longer to a reach for the old cane to get a new toy than a reach 
for a new cane to get the old toy; see Figure 15.3). Moreover, as in Sommerville et al.’s (2005) 
study, infants’ success in cane-pulling during training was correlated with their response to the 
habituation events. Infants who were more successful at cane-pulling during training showed 
stronger attention to the goal structure of the habituation events. Critically, first-person 
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experience had unique effects on infants’ analysis of the observed actions. Infants who received 
observational, rather than active, training recovered attention to both test events, indicating that 
they detected the changes in the test events, but did not respond differentially to the new-toy 
versus the new-cane events.  
Figure 15.3 about here 
Work by Meltzoff and Brooks provides further evidence that self-produced experience 
can inform infants’ analysis of others’ actions. In a previous study, Brooks and Meltzoff (2002) 
used infants’ propensity to follow gaze as a measure of their understanding of attentional 
relations. They found that, 14 and 18, but not 12-month-old, infants understood that an adult 
wearing a blindfold was not attending to an object in the direction of her head turn. Specifically, 
14- and 18-month-old infants were less likely to follow the direction of the adults’ gaze when the 
adult was wearing a blindfold, but 12-month-olds continued to follow the adults’ “gaze” under 
these conditions. However, in an intervention study (Meltzoff & Brooks, in press), after 12-
month-old infants were given experience wearing a blindfold, they inhibited the tendency to 
follow gaze when the adult was wearing the blindfold. Thus, self-produced experience with the 
blindfold seemed to give them insight into the perceptual experience of others in the same 
situation.  
These three examples demonstrating the effects of intervention suggest that being an 
agent provides infants with information about others’ actions. There are a number of issues that 
require further investigation. For one, the relative impacts of self-produced and matched 
observational experience require further study. Sommerville et al. (in press) findings indicate that 
self-produced experience has unique effects on infants’ action perception, but whether this is 
always the case is not yet known. Even so, evidence from these studies is strongly suggestive of 
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a causal link between action production and understanding. Ongoing work in our laboratory 
seeks to replicate and extend these findings. 
THEORETICAL LINKS BETWEEN ACTION PRODUCTION AND 
ACTION UNDERSTANDING 
Natural concordance in time, correlational data, and intervention data all support the conclusion 
that a link exists between action production and understanding. But why? One possibility is that 
by acting, infants produce for themselves examples for observational analysis. There is evidence 
that infants analyze the structure of observed actions in several ways that could support the 
extraction of goal information. First, infants attend to the outcomes of actions, and, in some 
cases, use these to infer the function, and perhaps goal, behind the action. For example, in a 
study by Hauf, Elsner, and Aschersleben (2004), 12- and 18-month-old infants were more likely 
to imitate an action that produced a sound than an action that did not produce any effect. Further, 
in some cases, action effects (such as moving an object to a new location) may help infants to 
interpret the goals of ambiguous actions (Biro & Leslie, 2006; Kiraly et al., 2003; but see 
Heineman-Pieper & Woodward, 2003).  
In addition, infants are sensitive to statistical regularities in temporally extended events 
(Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2003; Saffran, Aslin & Newport, 1996; see also Gomez, 
Kirkham, and Saffran chapters in this volume), and may therefore be able to extract recurring 
patterns in actions. Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark (2001) found that 10- and 11-month-old 
infants were sensitive to units in naturalistic action that corresponded to those defined by goal 
completions to adult observers. This finding may, in part, reflect infants’ statistical analysis of 
action elements that typically co-occur as units (Baird & Baldwin, 2001).  
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Clearly, self-produced actions would provide data for these kinds of statistical learning 
mechanisms to exploit. However, here we explore the further possibility that self-produced 
actions also provide unique information for the perception of goal-directed action. In support of 
this possibility, consider what infants seem not to learn by watching alone. Infants are constant 
witnesses to goal-directed actions like grasping, looking, and tool use, but knowledge about the 
goal structure of these actions is not evident from the start. Rather, as described earlier, infants’ 
sensitivity to the goal structure of these actions emerges, at different points, during the first year 
of life.  
SELF-PRODUCED ACTIONS AS UNIQUE SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Unlike observed actions, which can only provide information “at the surface” (e.g., the sequelae 
of actions), the regular patterns in self-produced actions could also provide unique information 
about the underlying goal structure of action. Agency requires representing the goals of one’s 
actions at some level. To coordinate complex actions in service of a goal, or to acquire a new 
goal-directed skill, like reaching by gradually gaining control over the relevant effectors, 
individuals must continue to represent the goals that structure their actions and adjust their 
actions as needed to attain the goal. This information could potentially be recruited to then 
interpret the perceived actions of others.  
This general idea has been broadly proposed in the developmental literature (Barresi & 
Moore, 1996; Meltzoff, 2005; Sommerville & Woodward, in press; Tomasello, 1999). Accounts 
differ, however, on two important dimensions: the nature of the information carried from self to 
other and the means by which information about the self is related to the actions of another 
person. On the first dimension, some have proposed that infants or young children derive mental 
state information from first-person experience, which they then use to infer similar states in 
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others (e.g. Meltzoff, 2005). In contrast, it is possible that the information available to infants 
from first-person experience is in terms of action level descriptions, rather than mental states. On 
the second dimension, some have hypothesized that children extend information from self to 
others via a process of analogical mapping (e.g., Barresi & Moore, 1996). In contrast, others 
have suggested a direct link between self and other, in the form of shared representations for 
one’s own and others’ actions (Hauf, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2007; Meltzoff, 2005; Sommerville 
et al., 2005). Although current evidence suggests that there is some truth to the general proposal 
that self-produced actions provide unique information for perceiving others’ actions, it does not 
indicate which of these more specific accounts is correct. Indeed, more than one of them could 
provide an accurate depiction of different aspects of action knowledge development.  
In one current proposal, Meltzoff (2005) proposes a developmental framework, 
nicknamed the “like me” account, in which information about self and other is directly connected 
because both are instantiated in a common supramodal representation and grounded in a 
common body schema. This direct connection provides infants with a means for apprehending 
the inner states that correlate with others’ observed actions, and it also supports imitation. By 
imitating an observed action, Meltzoff proposes, infants gain information, via their own 
experience, about the inner states of the other person. Meltzoff further proposes that infants do 
not begin with full-fledged conceptions of mental states like intention or perception, but rather 
they construct these concepts in the course of back and forth information sharing about their own 
and others’ actions. In this way, action understanding is direct and linked with internal states 
from the onset and infants’ understanding of their own and others’ mental lives becomes more 
abstract with development. 
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A somewhat different view has been elaborated by Barresi and Moore (1996). In this 
account, as in Meltzoff’s, information derived from first-person experience is critical for 
understanding the mental lives of others. Their perspective, however, views the connection 
between self and other as indirect and emerging through analogical mapping. According to their 
perspective, triadic interactions, in which individuals jointly attend to an object or event, are a 
key element in understanding the relation between self and others. Through joint engagement 
with an adult, the infant can directly align the actions of himself or herself with the actions of 
another individual. This physical alignment of actions provides the basis for the building of an 
intentional schema through analogy. 
Below, we propose an alternative account, similar in some respects to each of these 
perspectives, but also differing in several respects. Our proposal is informed by recent findings 
concerning the mirror system and recent debates concerning the nature of information this 
system provides the perceiver. To foreshadow, we propose that direct and indirect, mental and 
action-level information sharing occur at different points during development. Initially, the 
information provided by self-produced actions provides a direct, action-level description of goal-
directedness. This beginning point sets up the conditions for subsequent analogical mappings, 
which lead to more abstract levels of analysis. Before elaborating our proposal, we first review 
relevant research on the mirror system. 
ROLE OF MIRROR REPRESENTATIONS IN ACTION PERCEPTION 
Findings from the past decade provide evidence for a direct link between neurocognitive systems 
that subserve action production and action perception. The first evidence for this link came from 
primate research that identified neurons in motor regions that discharge both during the 
performance and the observation of goal-directed actions (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & 
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Fadiga, 1998). Subsequent research in humans has similarly indicated shared neural (Buccino et 
al, 2001; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Grezes & Decety, 2001; Iacoboni et al., 
1999) and cognitive (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) representations for 
perceiving and producing actions. Evidence in humans does not isolate individual neurons. 
Instead, researchers ask whether common brain regions support the production and perception of 
action. Our focus is not on the exact nature of the neural representations, but rather the functions 
that mirror representations may support in development. Specifically, three important functional 
characteristics of mirror representations have been revealed across a number of studies: (1) they 
provide a direct link between action and perception, (2) they are selectively sensitive to goal-
directed action, and (3) they are shaped by motor experience. Below, we will review evidence for 
each of these features. We will then discuss the status of infancy research in this area. 
Rizzolatti and colleagues (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Fadiga, 1998) found 
that neurons fire during both performance and observation of actions in monkeys, thus providing 
neural evidence for the link between action production and perception. In research with humans, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies have found a selective increase in motor-evoked 
potentials during observation of actions that are specific to those muscles used in the action 
(Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2001). In 
addition, evidence of corresponding areas of activation in the premotor cortex during action 
observation and execution has been found in functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and 
positron emission tomography (PET) studies (Buccino et al, 2001; Grafton et al., 1996; Grezes & 
Decety, 2001; Iacoboni et al., 1999). More recently, electroencephalography (EEG) studies have 
found a suppression of mu rhythm in both the production and the observation of actions 
(Altschuler, Vankov, Wang, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 1997; Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, & 
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Martineau, 1999). The mu rhythm is evident over motor areas, and is suppressed by movement, 
intended movement, or observation of movement (Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 
2004; Pineda, Allison, & Vankov, 2000). Together, these diverse findings point to the existence 
of shared neural representations for the production and perception of action. 
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese (2001) also found that mirror neurons in monkeys only 
discharged to an agent grasping an object, not to either the agent or object alone, suggesting that 
these neurons are selectively responsive to goal-directed actions (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996). Similar findings have been obtained in humans. For example, 
Muthukumaraswamy and colleagues (2004) found mu rhythm suppression occurred when adults 
viewed a grasping action of an object but not when this same action was produced without an 
object present. In humans, mirror representations seem to be sensitive to goals at more abstract 
levels as well, responding to events beyond the simple attainment of objects to include such 
actions as a dance movement or the use of chopsticks (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; 
Järveläinen, Schürmann, & Hari, 2004). 
Work by Calvo-Merino and colleagues (2005, 2006) highlights the expertise-driven 
nature of mirror representations. In one study, male dancers showed motor activation during the 
observation of dance movements they regularly produced but not during observation of 
movements regularly performed by female dancers, with which the males were extremely 
familiar but had no firsthand experience producing. Additionally, simple effects of gender were 
accounted for in that males watching females perform an action common to both genders did 
show activation of the mirror system. These findings demonstrate that action experience can lead 
to activation of the system and that mirror system activity is dependent on possessing a motor 
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representation for an action rather than simply having visual knowledge of the action. Additional 
evidence that action experience influences the mirror system is provided by Catmur, Walsh, & 
Heyes (2007). In this study, training in producing an action opposite to the one being observed 
reversed mirror effects, demonstrating that the mirror system is reliant on sensorimotor learning. 
Mirror Systems in Infancy 
Due to limitations in techniques for brain imaging with infants, the majority of work concerning 
the mirror system in humans has been done with adults. Currently, brain-based evidence of 
mirror systems in infants is extremely limited, but behavioral studies have provided indirect 
support for the idea that the mirror system may be functioning in human infants (see Lepage & 
Theoret, 2007). For example, neonatal imitation, in which newborn infants are able to imitate 
tongue protrusions without the ability to see the action they make themselves suggests a 
correspondence between representations of self and other in infancy (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). 
In addition, the evidence from looking time studies with older infants that is discussed above, in 
which infants’ understanding of goal-directed actions is correlated with their actions, is 
consistent with the notion that mirror system activity exists in infancy. 
A study by Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, and von Hofsten (2006) provides additional indirect 
support for the existence of mirror representations in infancy. Previous research has shown that 
adults produce systematic, proactive eye movements during the production of goal-directed 
actions. That is, adults make predictive eye movements in order to control and coordinate their 
actions. The same kind of predictive eye movements are made when an adult is watching others 
produce similar goal-directed actions (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). This finding is consistent 
with the possibility that a common system drives both attention to one’s own actions and 
attention to others’ actions. Following on this finding, Falck-Ytter and colleagues asked whether 
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infants anticipate the goals of observed actions. They showed infants sequences in which a 
person placed each of a set of balls into a container. Like adults, 12-month-old infants 
anticipated the goal of this sequence, looking to the bucket reliably before the ball’s arrival. In 
contrast, infants who viewed the same ball movements, this time without a human mover, 
followed the balls, but did not anticipate their arrival at the bucket. Based on these results, these 
researchers speculate that the mirror system is active in infancy and drives infants’ predictive 
attention to observed actions.  
A recent study provides the only brain-based evidence for the presence of a mirror system 
in human infants. Shimada and Hiraki (2006) conducted a study that examined brain activity 
during action observation in 7- and 8-month-old infants. In this study, the sensorimotor area was 
identified during a motor task in which adult participants were prompted to engage in repetitive 
hand movements and infant participants engaged in structured free-play. Then, the activity of 
motor areas was measured using near-infrared spectroscopy during action observation (in one 
condition, infants watched an experimenter manipulate a toy) in both adults and infants. The 
sensorimotor area was selectively activated during live action observation in both adults and 
infants. This area was not activated when observing a live object-motion condition in which the 
object moved on its own. Additionally, coding of the infants’ arm movements during free-play 
indicated that the observed motion was part of the motor repertoire of most infants, supporting 
the claim that the mirror system is sensitive to motions within an individual’s motor repertoire, 
even in infancy.  
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MIRROR REPRESENTATIONS: MENTAL STATE OR ACTION LEVEL 
DESCRIPTIONS? 
Mirror representations provide a direct path between actions of self and others that may be in 
place from infancy. They respond selectively to goal-directed actions and are shaped by agentive 
experience. A critical open question, however, is the extent to which mirror representations make 
contact with mental state concepts. Debates in the literature on the functions of mature mirror 
systems have highlighted this issue. 
Some theorists have taken up the mirror system findings as evidence in favor of 
simulation theory. The simulationist account posits that individuals can gain an understanding of 
others’ mental states by mentally simulating those actions themselves (Goldman, 1989; Gordon, 
1986; Harris, 1989; Heal, 1998). This theory proposes a direct link between first-person mental 
states and the comprehension of others’ mental states. In this way, individuals can “mirror” the 
actions of another and come to understand another’s actions based on their own past experience 
(without analyzing or building a theory). To illustrate, Gallese and Goldman (1998) proposed 
that mirror systems allow an individual to detect mental states in others because mirroring 
creates a match between mental activity of the observer and the actor, and, thus, the observer is 
able to use his or her own mental processes to understand and predict the mental goals of others. 
Blakemore and Decety (2001) also proposed that mental states can be inferred directly from 
biological motion through a process of simulation.  
Other researchers have countered this view with the argument that the mirror system may 
be useful in determining motor intentions but that it is not sufficient for understanding prior 
intentions and mental states more generally. Representing prior intentions entails an 
understanding of intentions as mental states that exist independent of the particular actions used 
to achieve the intended goal. Motor intentions, in contrast, are specified at the level of the goal at 
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which a particular action is directed. Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) argue that perceiving an action 
will lead to an understanding of motor intention but cannot lead to the understanding of an 
agent’s prior intention. They state, for example, that infants’ understanding of a basic grasp in a 
habituation paradigm may be due to motor simulation, but that this simulation is only possible 
for basic actions and intentions. Prior intentions, however, wherein the goal is not inherent in the 
action itself (i.e., opening a drawer in order to retrieve a pen from inside), cannot be represented 
by mirror systems alone.  
In its strongest form, the claim that the mirror system can only be used on the most basic 
level has been disputed by subsequent evidence that mirror neurons in primates and mirror 
systems in humans can represent not only the goals of simple actions, but also overarching goals 
that structure action sequences (Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005). For example, Fogassi 
and colleagues (2005) found mirror neurons in macaque monkeys that fired differentially to 
grasping actions that preceded eating versus placing of the grasped object when there were 
contextual cues to support one of these two analyses of the grasp. Thus, these neurons reflected 
processing, not of the basic action itself (grasping), but rather the ultimate goal at which the 
grasp was apparently directed (eating versus placing). Further, Ferrari, Rozzi, and Fogassi (2005) 
report the existence of “grasping” mirror neurons that fired for grasping done by varied effectors 
(e.g., the hand, the mouth or even a tool), thus indicating that mirror systems can reflect goal 
representations that are relatively abstract, at the level of action plans.  
Even so, mirror representations alone seem unlikely to account for the full range of 
mental state knowledge humans eventually acquire. To illustrate, Saxe (2005) argues that if 
belief attribution derived from direct simulation, then the pervasive belief attribution errors seen 
in children (and even in adults) would be difficult to explain. Rather, these errors indicate that 
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people’s judgments about others’ epistemic states are the product of an interpretive system 
(theory of mind) that can, in some cases, generate incorrect analyses.  
This debate concerning more mature mirror systems sheds light on the probable 
limitations of developing mirror systems in infants. Mirror systems, on their own, seem unlikely 
to directly yield higher order mental state descriptions. At the very least, however, they would 
provide action level or even plan level descriptions of actions as structured in relation to a goal. 
Descriptions at this level, whether or not they make contact with mental state concepts, could 
account for many of the infant findings reviewed in this chapter. For example, when an infant 
responds selectively to the change in the goal of a grasp in a habituation paradigm, this response, 
at a minimum, reflects an understanding of the relational goal structure of grasping actions (see 
also Gergely & Csibra, 2003). It may also reflect the attribution of a mental state, such as 
wanting the object or liking the object, but as of yet there is not strong evidence for this in infants 
under 12 months of age (see Biro & Leslie, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; and Woodward, 2005 for different perspectives on this issue).  
Thus, we assume at this point that, at a minimum, infants in the first year have action 
level and plan level representations of goal-directed action, leaving open the possibility that they 
may also represent information about the inner states that drive action. In addition to accounting 
for the data from younger infants, the structural level of description could provide an initial 
representational kernel for the subsequent development of intentional action knowledge. We turn 
next to this possibility. 
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RELATIONAL ACTION REPRESENTATIONS AND STRUCTURE 
MAPPING: A PROPOSAL 
We propose that early in the first year, as infants begin to organize their own actions with respect 
to external goal objects, they acquire relational action representations that enable the perception 
of others’ actions as structured by goals. Thus, as infants acquire new ways of acting (i.e., 
reaching, using a tool to acquire an object, pointing), they also attain new action level 
representations of each of these actions. These representations may reflect the activity of a mirror 
system that, as reviewed above, reflects representations accessible to both action production and 
action perception, is tuned to actions that are goal-directed, and is shaped by motor experience. 
This proposal is motivated by the findings, reviewed above, that (1) young infants encode others’ 
actions as goal-directed and they express this action analysis in their overt actions as well as their 
looking time responses; (2) infants’ goal encoding is correlated with developments in their own 
actions; (3) interventions that shape infants’ own actions also affect their responses to others’ 
actions; and (4) initial evidence suggesting that self-produced actions exert unique, or especially 
potent, effects on infants’ action perception. 
On our proposal, the action representations infants initially glean from agentive 
experience may be limited in two ways: They may be specific to particular actions and they may 
describe action in structural rather than rich mentalistic terms. Despite these limitations, they 
reflect a critical aspect of action structure, namely, that actions are structured by the relation 
between the agent and his or her goal. We propose that this relational core provides a basis for 
generalizing initial knowledge so as to create broader classes of goal-directed actions and to 
move toward more abstract representations of goals.  
The literature on conceptual generalization in older children and adults provides a model 
of how this process could occur in infancy. In particular, Gentner and her colleagues have 
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described a general cognitive mechanism that can extract increasingly abstract levels of 
relational similarity across instances (Gentner, 1988; Gentner & Medina, 1998). Because it 
yields abstract relational representations, this structure mapping engine (SME) seems especially 
well suited to the case of goal-directed action. The structure mapping engine is essentially an 
analogy maker. Instances are aligned based on similar features and this alignment promotes 
attention to other shared dimensions. Alignment and comparison supports the detection of 
abstract, relational similarities that may not be initially obvious to the observer.  
To illustrate, in one set of studies, Loewenstein and Gentner (2001) showed 3-year-old 
children a toy bone hidden in relation to an object in a model room (e.g., under the bed). Then, 
children were shown another model room that had different-looking exemplars of each piece of 
furniture, similarly arranged to the first room. They were told there was a bone in the same place 
in this room. Children were generally unsuccessful in finding the second bone, suggesting they 
found it difficult to apply the relational information (the bone is under the bed) to the new, 
dissimilar room. To facilitate children’s ability to see the common relational structure between 
the two rooms, Loewenstein and Gentner showed a second group of children two nearly identical 
model rooms with bones hidden in the same location. Then, children saw the dissimilar test room 
and were asked to find the bone hidden in the “same place.” In this condition, children generally 
succeeded in finding the bone. Thus, alignment of perceptually similar instances supported 
children’s ability to extract the common relational structure among even dissimilar instances. 
These effects were strongest when children could directly compare the first two models at the 
same time. However, even comparison across sequentially presented models helped. 
Further, alignment of perceptually similar instances also supports children’s extraction of 
higher-order relations. For example, Loewenstein and Gentner (2001) found that the opportunity 
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to compare similar rooms also facilitated the extraction of embedded relational similarities. 
Specifically, on some trials, the bone was hidden under one of two identical chairs. To find the 
hidden bone, children had to represent not only the relation between the bone and the hiding 
place (i.e., under the chair) but also the relation between the chair and other objects in the room 
(i.e., under the chair that is next to the bed). The older children in the study were able to use 
comparisons of this embedded relational structure to find the hidden bone. Furthermore, 
Kotovsky and Gentner (1996) found that aligning items based on relatively concrete relations 
facilitated 4-year-old children’s subsequent ability to discern higher-order relational structure. 
For example, if children were trained with perceptually similar examples of the relation small-
big-small, they were then better able to detect the higher-order relational similarity between 
small-big-small patterns and A-B-A patterns in other dimensions (e.g., dark-light-dark). These 
examples show that beginning with relatively concrete comparisons can support the extraction of 
higher-order relational structure. 
If infants, like older children, engage in structure mapping, then this mechanism could 
explain how initial, self-generated action representations become more general and abstract. For 
one, it would provide a mechanism for moving beyond particular actions, e.g., grasping with the 
hand, to categories of actions that subsume a broader range of instances, e.g. obtaining objects 
with varied hand postures or other affectors. As in Loewenstein and Gentner’s (2001) studies, 
infants may begin by detecting relational similarities among similar-looking actions (e.g., 
grasping with the hands), and by so doing become more sensitive to the relational similarity 
among more disparate actions.  
Recent findings show that infants sometimes detect goal relations for events in which 
objects are moved or obtained by unusual hand postures or inanimate agents (Biro & Leslie, 
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2006; Hauf et al., 2004; Kiraly et al., 2003). These results are generally taken as evidence that 
infants possess abstract concepts of intention that arise independent of experience (see Biro & 
Leslie, 2006; Kiraly et al., 2003). However, many of these findings would also be expected if 
infants generalized familiar action representations via structure mapping. Specifically, these 
extensions seem to occur most readily when (1) infants have a well-established relational action 
representation and (2) the situation promotes alignment between the infants’ action 
representation and the novel event. First, the propensity to view unusual events as goal-directed 
is more often seen in older than younger infants, and those experiments that include infants at 
multiple ages find age differences (Biro & Leslie, 2006; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 
1995; Hauf et al., 2004). It could be assumed that age is a reasonable proxy for the robustness of 
infants’ self-produced action representations. Second, infants more readily construe unusual 
events as goal-directed when they involve unusual hand postures than when they involve 
inanimate agents (Biro & Leslie, 2006; Hauf et al., 2004; Woodward, 1998). This effect may be 
due to the presence of hands supporting alignment with familiar hand actions.  
Structure mapping may also facilitate extracting and generalizing the relational structure 
of embedded actions, such as using a tool to draw an object near before grasping it. Tool use 
presents a challenge for the perceiver because the action on the tool does not make direct contact 
with the goal object. Sommerville and colleagues’ (in press) work suggests that self-produced 
means–end action provides insight into the embedded relational structure of others’ actions. 
Once this is in place, structure mapping would allow infants to generalize this structure across 
diverse tool use events. For example, an infant who had experienced and observed multiple 
cloth-pulling events might then be able to discern means–end structure in a novel tool use event, 
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just as children in Kotovsky and Gentner’s (1996) study were able to detect higher-order 
relational similarities among patterns after aligning multiple instances of the relation.  
Structure mapping can extract relational similarities starting at the level of pure object 
similarity, with no initial relational content. However, as detailed above, we hypothesize that 
infants begin one step ahead in this process in that they bring with them relational 
representations of some actions. This differs from Barresi and Moore’s (1996) view of the role of 
analogy in extracting intentional relations. In their view, infants do not begin with relational 
representations, but rather derive them from the physical alignment of their own actions with the 
actions of others. For this reason, they hypothesize that triadic interactions are especially 
important for the process. On our proposal, infants may represent intentional relations before 
they reliably engage in triadic interactions.  
Beginning with a relational kernel would have several advantages. Real world actions are 
not as neatly packaged as are habituation events or stimuli in analogical mapping experiments. 
Hand trajectories and shapes differ as different objects are grasped. People seldom grasp the 
same object again and again. Furthermore, except in some specific contexts, like triadic 
interactions, it is relatively rare for infants’ actions to be directed at the same objects as others’ 
actions at the same time. Thus, infants must be able to extract common goal structure across 
exemplars that are varied and distributed in time. Therefore, the conditions that have been shown 
to support the extraction of relational structure from initial object similarity may rarely occur in 
the domain of action, especially early in infancy. Beginning with a few self-generated relational 
action representations would support infants’ ability to identify others’ goal-directed actions in 
the face of the challenges posed by variability and temporal dispersion. As work with older 
children has shown, once children have established relational representations, they are less 
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dependent on surface similarity and physical alignment of instances in extending this relational 
information to new instances. 
Furthermore, hands move in many ways, not all of them object-directed. If infants began 
only with the ability to map events in terms of similarities in the objects involved, they might 
note that events with hands that grasp, gesture, snap, tap, scratch, etc. are all similar in that they 
involve hands. However, they would miss the critical underlying similarity that unites disparate 
goal-directed actions (e.g., lifting a box with two hands and picking up a cheerio with a pincer 
grip) and makes them different from other “hand events.” Relational action representations 
would highlight for infants the common relational structure of goal-directed actions, thus 
distinguishing them from other hand movements or motion events.  
In summary, we propose that infants begin with self-generated, relational action 
representations that guide their perception of others’ actions. Structure mapping provides one 
means for going beyond these initial representations, allowing infants to discern common 
relational structure across diverse actions. In this way, infants may take the first step in 
separating goals from the particular actions that pursue them.  
This independence from particular actions is one critical piece of what it means to 
understand a goal or plan as a mental state. Thus, it is possible that structure mapping plays a 
role in the development of folk concepts of mental states. We assume that this is only part of the 
story. Mature mental state concepts are embedded in and defined by theory-like systems of 
knowledge (Wellman, 1990). The acquisition of such knowledge systems involves the interplay 
of cognitive learning mechanisms in the child and information from the environment, including 
linguistic information. Indeed, Gentner (2003) has highlighted the role of language in supporting 
the acquisition of abstract relational concepts. Gentner and Medina (1998) have proposed a 
 626 
similar account for the role of structure mapping in the acquisition of folk theoretical knowledge 
in other domains, for example the concept of essences in folk biology.  
Mental state knowledge becomes increasingly rich during the preschool years (Wellman, 
1990). Even as early as 18 to 24 months of age, children verbally express knowledge about 
mental states, such as states of attention, emotions, and intentions (Bartch & Wellman, 1995). 
Further, recent experiments suggest that by these same ages children may understand belief 
states (Csibra & Southgate, 2006; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 
2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). This interpretation of the findings is debated, but at the 
very least, these studies demonstrate relatively rich understanding of others’ states of attention. It 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to resolve this debate. Nevertheless, by these ages, we think it 
is possible that joint contributions of action analysis and linguistic input could contribute to 
initial mental state concepts. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have presented a constructivist hypothesis regarding the development of 
action and intention understanding. We propose that emerging abilities to act, mirror 
representations, and analogy each play an important role in this constructive process. The 
development of intention understanding occurs through the progression from an initial structural 
understanding of goal-directed actions provided by mirror systems to a more abstract 
understanding through application of general purpose analogical mapping processes. Mirror 
systems may get the process started, but further ontogenetic processes are needed to produce the 
abstract action knowledge children eventually attain. 
Our account is similar to Meltzoff’s (2005) “like me” hypothesis in many important 
ways. We concur that action understanding is grounded in shared representation of self and 
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other, and that action knowledge develops from relatively concrete to abstract forms during 
infancy and early childhood. Our account differs in two respects. For one, we propose that the 
extension of self-generated action representations to others can take place without the infant or 
child needing to engage in motor imitation. On Meltzoff’s account, engagement in imitation is 
critical for infants’ interpretation of others’ intentions in acting. On our view, action 
representations acquired from first-person experience can then function “off-line” to provide 
structure for perceiving other’s actions.  
Further, we suggest that these action representations can undergo change as a function of 
observational extension. An infant with well-structured means-end action representations may 
extend them to observed actions with a novel tool, and by so doing, enrich the action knowledge 
they can bring to bear in future events. That is, once it is engaged, structure mapping can operate 
on observational as well as self-produced examples. This proposal is consistent with the finding 
that by the second year of life, infants engage in observational learning, imitating new actions 
with artifacts or tools. Even so, because they bring with them relational content, self-produced 
actions may continue to render especially powerful effects on children’s emerging action 
knowledge. 
A second difference between our proposal and Meltzoff’s is that we are more 
conservative in our estimation of whether and when infants conceive of others’ actions as being 
caused by mental states. In Meltzoff’s account (2005), inner or mental states are part of what is 
extended from self to other from the start. As we have described, we think it is also possible to 
account for young infants’ action knowledge in structural terms, and we further hypothesize that 
structural representations of goal-directed action may provide a foundation for later emerging 
mental state concepts. On the other hand, our account does not make a clear prediction of when 
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in this chain of events the first “mental” concepts will arise. In fact, we think the question of 
when an action representation counts as “mental” is complex and difficult to address given 
evidence from infancy research (see Woodward, 2005).  
Our proposal, though consistent with much of what is currently known, raises a number 
of questions to motivate future research. To start, we propose that infants’ own actions yield 
relational action representations that observation alone cannot provide. If we are right, then 
laboratory manipulations of infants’ own actions should change their perceptual responses in 
ways that observational training does not. Recent findings from Sommerville’s group 
(Sommerville et al., in press) are consistent with this hypothesis, but more work is needed to test 
the limits of this hypothesis. Further, we hypothesize that structure mapping processes play a role 
in the generalization of infants’ action knowledge. If we are right, then the same kinds of 
laboratory manipulations that have been shown to influence older children’s generalization of 
relational information should influence infants’ responses to action structure. Work currently 
underway in our laboratory is investigating each of these hypotheses.  
Finally, our account predicts that the action representations derived in infancy contribute 
to the eventual emergence of folk concepts of mental states. Evidence in favor of this final 
prediction comes from several recent longitudinal studies documenting that infants’ action 
analysis predicts their responses, some years later, on verbal theory of mind measures 
(Aschersleben & Hohenberger, 2007; Kuhlmeier & Yamaguchi, 2007; Poulin-Dubois & Olineck, 
2007; Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, & Lalonde, 2004). Infants who respond more 
systematically to the intentional structure of others’ actions go on to become preschoolers who 
respond more systematically on classic theory of mind assessments, like the false-belief task. 
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Thus, the initial steps we have begun to uncover during infancy seem to begin a long journey in 
the construction of folk psychology. 
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